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Abstract
How does patent policy a¤ect long-run economic growth through
the population growth rate? To analyze this question, we develop
an R&D-based growth model with endogenous fertility. In recent
vintages of R&D-based growth models in which scale e¤ects are ab-
sent, the long-run growth rate depends on the population growth rate
that is assumed to be exogenous. In this study, we develop a semi-
endogenous-growth version of the quality-ladder model with endoge-
nous fertility and human-capital accumulation to analyze an unex-
plored interaction between intellectual property rights, endogenous
fertility and economic growth. We nd that strengthening patent pro-
tection has a surprisingly negative e¤ect on technological progress in
the long run through endogenous fertility. Furthermore, a stronger
cultural preference on fertility tends to magnify this negative e¤ect of
patent policy on long-run growth.
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1 Introduction
How does patent policy a¤ect long-run economic growth through the pop-
ulation growth rate? To analyze this question, we develop a scale-invariant
R&D-based growth model with endogenous fertility. In the literature on
R&D-driven economic growth, there has been a very important debate about
the presence of counterfactual scale e¤ects (i.e., a positive relationship be-
tween population size and long-run growth) in the rst-generation mod-
els, such as Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and
Howitt (1992). In response to this critique, subsequent generations of R&D-
based growth models have been developed to remove these scale e¤ects.1 In
these scale-invariant models, the long-run growth rate is either solely or partly
determined by the population growth rate that is assumed to be exogenous.
However, in a more realistic framework, the fertility rate should be treated as
an endogenous variable chosen by optimizing households. In this study, we
develop two versions of the scale-invariant quality-ladder model with endoge-
nous fertility and apply this growth-theoretic framework to analyze the e¤ects
of intellectual property rights on fertility and long-run economic growth. To
our knowledge, this interaction between patent policy, endogenous fertility
and economic growth has never been explored in the literature. Furthermore,
in recent vintages of R&D-based growth models, the long-run growth rate is
usually increasing in the population growth rate (i.e., a weak scale e¤ect);
however, even this weak scale e¤ect is not supported empirically.2 Therefore,
we follow Strulik (2005) to allow for human-capital accumulation in order to
further remove this weak scale e¤ect.
In the model, optimizing households choose the fertility rate by trading o¤
the marginal utility of higher fertility against its marginal costs arising from
(a) foregone wages, (b) the dilution of nancial assets per capita, and (c) the
dilution of human capital per capita. In the semi-endogenous-growth version
of the quality-ladder model,3 we nd that strengthening patent protection
that increases the market power of rms weakens the foregone-wage e¤ect
and the human-capital-diluting e¤ect but strengthens the asset-diluting e¤ect
of fertility. On the one hand, weakening the foregone-wage e¤ect and the
1See Jones (1999) for an excellent review on these subsequent generations of R&D-based
growth models.
2See for example Strulik (2005) for a discussion.
3Early studies on the R&D-based semi-endogenous growth model include Jones (1995),
Kortum (1997) and Segerstrom (1998).
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human-capital-diluting e¤ect leads to a higher fertility rate. On the other
hand, strengthening the asset-diluting e¤ect leads to a lower fertility rate.
We nd that the e¤ects of patent policy on the dilution of nancial assets and
the dilution of human capital cancel each other. As a result, strengthening
patent protection unambiguously increases fertility through weakening the
foregone-wage e¤ect, and this higher rate of fertility in turn reduces the
growth rate of human capital and technological progress in the long run.
Furthermore, we calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy
to provide a quantitative analysis. We nd that the magnitude of the nega-
tive e¤ect of patent policy on long-run economic growth crucially depends on
a preference parameter on fertility and is increasing in its parameter value.
Given a reasonable parameter value for the US economy, the long-run growth
e¤ect of strengthening patent protection under endogenous fertility is simi-
lar to under exogenous fertility. Therefore, applying an R&D-based growth
model with exogenous fertility to analyze intellectual property protection in
the US may serve as a useful approximation to a more realistic model with en-
dogenous fertility. However, for a culture in which there is a strong preference
on fertility, the negative growth e¤ect of patent policy through endogenous
fertility could be quantitatively signicant. For example, Fernandez and Fogli
(2009) provide empirical evidence to show that preference on fertility varies
across culture and has a signicant e¤ect on fertility outcomes.4
In addition to the semi-endogenous-growth version of the quality-ladder
model, we also consider an alternative specication that removes scale e¤ects
through diluting R&D inputs by the scale of the economy following Laincz
and Peretto (2006). Under this specication, the equilibrium growth rate
depends on both the population growth rate and the share of labor allocated
to R&D resembling a second-generation model.5 In this case, strengthening
patent protection has a positive e¤ect on the R&D share of labor, which
increases the growth rate. Interestingly, it has no e¤ect on the population
growth rate. Therefore, the di¤erent equilibrium e¤ects of patent policy on
long-run growth may serve as an indirect test for the two alternative solutions
to the scale-e¤ect problem.6
4Fernandez and Fogli (2009) use the past total fertility rate in the country of ancestry
as a proxy for cultural preference on fertility and nd that second-generation Americans
whose ancestry is from countries with higher fertility rates tend to have more children.
5Early studies on the second-generation R&D-based endogenous growth model include
Young (1998), Dinopoulos and Thompson (1998), and Peretto (1998).
6For example, Laincz and Peretto (2006) and Ha and Howitt (2007) provide some inter-
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Our study relates to the literature on endogenous fertility and R&D-
driven growth for which Growiec (2006) provides an excellent review.7 Jones
(2001) develops an R&D-based growth model with endogenous fertility to
analyze the emergence of rapid growth and demographic transitions. To
simplify their analysis, both Jones (2001) and Growiec (2006) consider a
model in which the allocation of inputs between R&D and production is
exogenously determined. The present study di¤ers from Jones (2001) and
Growiec (2006) by developing a quality-ladder model in which both fertility
and the allocation of factor inputs are endogenously determined through the
market equilibrium. Therefore, our model follows more closely the footsteps
of Connolly and Peretto (2003), who develop an R&D-based growth model
with vertical and horizontal innovations to analyze demographic shocks and
industrial policies that a¤ect the costs of R&D and/or entry. However, our
model di¤ers from Connolly and Peretto (2003) by featuring human-capital
accumulation as well as creative destruction that gives rise to the impor-
tance of patent breadth that protects an innovation against previous inno-
vations. Therefore, the present study complements their interesting analysis
by analyzing another important set of industrial policy that is the e¤ects of
intellectual property rights on fertility and economic growth.
Our study also relates to the literature on patent policy and economic
growth. The seminal study in the literature on optimal patent design is
Nordhaus (1969).8 While studies in this patent-design literature mostly an-
alyze patent policy in partial-equilibrium models, the present study follows
more closely a related macroeconomic literature by analyzing the e¤ects of
patent policy in a quantitative dynamic general-equilibrium model. The sem-
inal dynamic general-equilibrium analysis on optimal patent length is Judd
(1985), who nds that the optimal patent length can be innite. Subsequent
studies by Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007)
show that the optimal patent length is usually nite in the Romer model due
to an additional distortionary e¤ect on intermediate goods that is absent in
Judd (1985).9 While this branch of studies focuses on characterizing the op-
timal patent length, another branch of studies in the literature analyzes the
esting empirical investigations on the two branches of scale-invariant R&D-based growth
models.
7See also Barro and Becker (1989) for a seminal study on endogenous fertility in an
overlapping-generation model with exogenous growth.
8See Scotchmer (2004) for a comprehensive review of this patent-design literature.
9See also Horowitz and Lai (1996).
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e¤ects of other patent-policy levers on innovation and growth. See, for ex-
ample, Li (2001) on patent breadth,10 ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) on
forward patent protection and patentability requirement, Cozzi (2001) and
Cozzi and Spinesi (2006) on intellectual appropriability, Furukawa (2007,
2010) and Horri and Iwaisako (2007) on patent protection against imita-
tion, and Chu (2009) on blocking patents. Some of these studies nd that
strengthening patent protection may generate a negative e¤ect on innovation
and technological progress, and this nding is consistent with the detailed
case studies analyzed in Ja¤e and Lerner (2004), Bessen and Meurer (2008)
and Boldrin and Levine (2008). The present study contributes to this litera-
ture by analyzing a novel channel (i.e., endogenous fertility) through which
patent policy may generate a negative e¤ect on long-run economic growth
while having a positive e¤ect on R&D.
Finally, this study relates to a growing literature on culture and economic
growth. A recent empirical study by Tabellini (2010) provides evidence that
cultural traits, such as trust, respect for others, condence in individual self-
determination, and emphasis on childrens obedience, have signicant causal
e¤ects on regional per capita income in Europe. Another interesting empirical
study by Alesina and Giuliano (2010) analyzes the e¤ects of family ties on
economic outcomes, such as home production and labor force participation
of women and youth. In terms of theoretical work, a seminal study by Galor
and Moav (2002) shows that individual preferences on o¤spring quality a¤ect
the speed of transition to sustained economic growth. A subsequent study by
Ashraf and Galor (2007) analyzes the relative advantage of two interesting
cultural characteristics, namely, cultural assimilation and cultural diversity,
at di¤erent stages of economic development. Another recent study by Chu
(2007) argues that cultural variation in entrepreneurial overcondence can
play a role in causing di¤erent rates of economic growth across countries. The
present study relates to this literature by showing that cultural preference on
fertility not only has a direct e¤ect on long-run economic growth but it may
also have an indirect e¤ect on growth through intellectual property rights.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the semi-
endogenous-growth version of the model. Section 3 denes the equilibrium
and derives the balanced-growth path. Section 4 analyzes the e¤ects of patent
policy on fertility and economic growth. Section 5 considers an extension of
10See also Chu (2011) for a quantitative analysis on uniform versus sector-specic opti-
mal patent breadth in a two-sector quality-ladder growth model.
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the model with fully endogenous growth. The nal section concludes.
2 A quality-ladder model with endogenous
fertility and human-capital accumulation
In this section, we consider the semi-endogenous-growth formulation of the
Grossman-Helpman (1991) quality-ladder model based on Segerstrom (1998).
The key changes in our model are as follows. First, we consider endogenous
fertility instead of exogenous fertility following the setup in Razin and Ben-
Zion (1975) and Yip and Zhang (1997). Second, we allow for variable patent
breadth as in Li (2001) in order to analyze the e¤ects of patent policy. Finally,
we introduce human-capital accumulation as in Strulik (2005) to further
remove the weak scale e¤ect. Given that the quality-ladder model has been
well-studied, we will describe the familiar features briey to conserve space
and discuss the new features in details.
2.1 Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households. As is standard in the liter-
ature on endogenous fertility, households derive utility from fertility. Here we
consider a continuous-time setup similar to Yip and Zhang (1997). However,
considering a discrete-time setup with overlapping generations of households
as in Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) would not change our results. The inter-
generational utility of households is the discounted sum of per capita utility
across time.11 Specically, the utility function of a household is given by
U =
Z 1
0
e tu(ct; nt)dt, (1)
where u(ct; nt) = ln ct +  lnnt. ct is consumption per capita at time t, and
nt is the fertility rate.  is a fertility-preference parameter, and  > 0 is
the discount rate. In this simple model with zero mortality, nt is also the
population growth rate.
11See Growiec (2006) for an interesting discussion on alternative ways of modelling
endogenous fertility in the growth literature.
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Each household maximizes (1) subject to the following asset-accumulation
equation.
:
at = (rt   nt)at + wtlt   ct. (2)
at is the amount of nancial assets per capita, and rt is the rate of return
on assets. An increase in nt reduces the amount of assets per capita, and we
refer to this e¤ect as the asset-diluting e¤ect of fertility. wt is the wage rate,
and lt is human-capital embodied labor supply. Each person has one unit
of time to allocate between fertility, work and education. The time spent
on fertility is given by nt= < 1, where  is a parameter that is negatively
related to the time cost of fertility. At time t, the stock of human capital per
capita is ht. Each person combines her remaining time endowment 1  nt=
with her human capital ht for work lt and education et subject to
ht(1  nt=) = lt + et. (3)
Increasing nt reduces the amount of time available for work and education,
and this setup captures the foregone-wage e¤ect of fertility. The law of
motion for human capital per capita is
:
ht = et   ( + nt)ht, (4)
where  is a productivity parameter for human-capital accumulation. We
impose  >  in order for et to be non-negative (to be shown later). ntht
captures the human-capital-diluting e¤ect of fertility as in Strulik (2005).
The parameter  is the depreciation rate of human capital. Given that this
parameter does not a¤ect our results, we set  to zero for simplicity. Finally,
the law of motion for the population size is
:
N t = ntNt.
From standard dynamic optimization, the Euler equation is
:
ct
ct
= rt   nt   , (5)
and the consumption-fertility optimality condition is

nt
=
1
ct

at +

1

+
1


wtht

. (6)
This condition equates the marginal utility of fertility given by =nt to the
marginal utility of consumption (in response to a change in fertility) given
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by [at + wtht (1= + 1=)] =ct. The rst term at=ct captures the asset-diluting
e¤ect of fertility, and this e¤ect is positively related to the value of assets
per capita. The second term  1wtht=ct captures the foregone-wage e¤ect of
fertility, and the third term  1wtht=ct captures the human-capital-diluting
e¤ect of fertility. Both of these e¤ects are positively related to the wage rate.
From dynamic optimization, we can also derive an equilibrium condition for
the growth rate of wt given by
:
wt
wt
= rt   (1  nt=). (7)
We will show that this condition determines the equilibrium growth rate of
human capital.
2.2 Final goods
Final goods are produced by competitive rms that aggregate intermediate
goods using a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregator given by
Yt = exp
Z 1
0
lnXt(i)di

. (8)
Xt(i) denotes intermediate goods i 2 [0; 1]. From prot maximization, the
conditional demand function for Xt(i) is
Xt(i) = Yt=pt(i), (9)
where pt(i) is the price of Xt(i).
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated intermediate
goods. Each industry is temporarily dominated by an industry leader until
the arrival of the next innovation, and the owner of the new innovation
becomes the next industry leader.12 The production function for the leader
in industry i is
Xt(i) = z
qt(i)Lx;t(i). (10)
12This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect in the literature. See Cozzi (2007) for
a discussion on the Arrow e¤ect.
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The parameter z > 1 is the step size of productivity improvement, and qt(i) is
the number of productivity improvements that have occurred in industry i as
of time t. Lx;t(i) is production labor in industry i. Given zqt(i), the marginal
cost of production for the industry leader in industry i ismct(i) = wt=zqt(i). It
is useful to note that we here adopt a cost-reducing view of vertical innovation
as in Peretto (1998, 1999).
Standard Bertrand price competition leads to a prot-maximizing price
given by
pt(i) = (z; b)mct(i), (11)
where  = zb > 1 and b 2 (0; 1) denotes patent breadth. In the original
Grossman-Helpman (1991) model, the patentholder is assumed to have com-
plete protection against imitation such that b = 1. Li (2001) considers a
more general policy environment with incomplete patent protection against
imitation such that b 2 (0; 1). Here we follow the formulation in Li (2001).
From (9), the amount of monopolistic prot is
t(i) =

  1


pt(i)Xt(i) =

  1


Yt. (12)
Therefore, a larger patent breadth b increases the markup  and the amount
of monopolistic prot improving the incentives for R&D. For the rest of
this study, we use  to measure the strength of patent protection. Finally,
production-labor income is
wtLx;t(i) =
pt(i)Xt(i)

=
Yt

. (13)
Equations (12) and (13) show that strengthening patent protection increases
the share of prot income (i.e., t=Yt) and decreases the share of wage income
(i.e., wtLx;t=Yt). Through these e¤ects, patent policy a¤ects the equilibrium
rate of fertility.
2.4 R&D
Denote vt(i) as the share value of the monopolistic rm in industry i. Because
t(i) = t for i 2 [0; 1] from (12), vt(i) = vt in a symmetric equilibrium that
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features an equal arrival rate of innovation across industries.13 In this case,
the familiar no-arbitrage condition for vt is
rtvt = t +
:
vt   tvt. (14)
This condition equates the interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset.
The asset return is the sum of (a) monopolistic prot t, (b) potential capital
gain
:
vt and (c) expected capital loss tvt from creative destruction for which
t is the arrival rate of the next innovation.
There is a unit continuum of R&D rms indexed by j 2 [0; 1]. They hire
R&D labor Lr;t(j) for innovation. The zero-expected-prot condition of rm
j is
vtt(j) = wtLr;t(j), (15)
where the rm-level arrival rate of innovation is
t(j) = 'Lr;t(j)=Zt, (16)
where Zt denotes aggregate technology. Here we follow Segerstrom (1998)
to remove the strong scale e¤ects (i.e., a counterfactual positive relationship
between population size and long-run economic growth) by assuming that
R&D productivity '=Zt falls as technology accumulates. Because Lr;t =R 1
0
Lr;t(j)dj, the aggregate arrival rate of innovation is t = 'Lr;t=Zt.
3 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fct; nt; ht; lt; Nt; Yt; Xt(i); Lx;t(i); Lr;t(j)g
and a time path of prices fpt(i); wt; rt; vtg. Also, at each instance of time,
 households maximize utility taking frt; wtg as given;
 competitive nal-goods rms produce fYtg to maximize prot taking
fpt(i)g as given;
13We follow the standard approach in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilib-
rium. See Cozzi et al. (2007) for a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium
to be the unique rational-expectation equilibrium in the quality-ladder growth model.
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 monopolistic intermediate-goods rms produce fXt(i)g and choose fLx;t(i); pt(i)g
to maximize prot taking fwtg as given;
 R&D rms choose fLr;t(j)g to maximize expected prot taking fwt; vtg
as given;
 the market-clearing condition for human-capital embodied labor supply
holds such that ltNt = Lx;t + Lr;t;
 the market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that Yt = ctNt;
and
 the value of household assets adds up to the share value of monopolistic
rms such that vt = atNt.
The aggregate production function is given by
Yt = ZtLx;t, (17)
where aggregate technology Zt is dened as
Zt = exp
Z 1
0
qt(i)di ln z

= exp
Z t
0
d ln z

. (18)
The second equality of (18) applies the law of large numbers. Di¤erentiating
the log of (18) with respect to t yields the growth rate of aggregate technology
given by
gz;t 
:
Zt
Zt
= t ln z = (' ln z)
Lr;t
Zt
. (19)
3.1 Balanced growth path
In this section, we focus on the balanced growth path, along which each
variable grows at a constant (possibly zero) rate. On the balanced growth
path, the arrival rate of innovation is constant so that Lr;t and Zt must grow
at the same rate implying that
gz = gh + n, (20)
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where gh is the steady-state growth rate of human capital per capita. In a
standard semi-endogenous growth model, gh equals zero and n is exogenous.
However, in our model with endogenous fertility, the long-run growth rate
of technology becomes endogenous. Furthermore, with endogenous human-
capital accumulation, gh is decreasing in n, and hence, gz could also be
decreasing in n.
Combining (13) and (17) yields wt = Zt=, which implies
:
Zt
Zt
=
:
wt
wt
=
:
ct
ct
+ nt +   (1  nt=), (21)
where the second equality of (21) is derived by substituting (5) into (7). The
steady-state growth rate of consumption per capita is
gc = gy   n = gz + gh, (22)
where gy is the steady-state growth rate of Yt. Substituting (22) into (21)
yields
gh = (1  n=)  n  . (23)
Therefore, the growth rate of human capital per capita is decreasing in n.
The rst negative e¤ect (i.e.,  n=) arises from the crowding out of fertility
on the time endowment. The second negative e¤ect (i.e.,  n) is the human-
capital-diluting e¤ect. Substituting (23) into (20) yields
gz = (1  n=)  . (24)
Therefore, the growth rate of aggregate technology is also decreasing in n
because the negative e¤ects of n on gh dominate the (weak) scale e¤ect of n
on gz. Finally, the growth rate of consumption ct is
gc = 2(   )  (1 + 2=)n, (25)
which is also decreasing in n. In other words, by introducing human-capital
accumulation into the semi-endogenous growth model, we are able to gener-
ate a negative relationship between fertility and long-run growth as in Strulik
(2005). Furthermore, in our model, endogenous fertility generates an addi-
tional negative e¤ect on human-capital accumulation through the crowding
out of time endowment that is absent in the Strulik exogenous-fertility model.
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Here we dene two useful notations sr;t  Lr;t=(htNt) and sx;t  Lx;t=(htNt).
Using (13) and (15), we derive the rst equation for solving the steady-state
equilibrium n as follows.
vtt
Lr;t
= wt =
Yt
Lx;t
, sr
sx
= (  1) 
+ 
, (26)
where the steady-state equilibrium innovation-arrival rate  is given by
(n
 
) =
gz
ln z
=
(1  n=)  
ln z
. (27)
The second equation for solving the model can be obtained by combining the
time-endowment constraint and the labor-market clearing condition.
1  n

=
lt
ht
+
et
ht
= sr + sx +
et
ht
. (28)
From (4), the steady-state growth rate of ht is
gh 
:
ht
ht
= 
et
ht
  n. (29)
Equating (29) and (23) yields14
et
ht
= 1  n

  

. (30)
In order for et  0, it requires that n  n  (1   =), which also ensures
  0 from (27). Using (30), we can simplify (28) to


= sr + sx. (31)
Finally, the last equation for solving the model is the consumption-fertility
optimality condition in (6).15

n
=
at
ct
+

1

+
1


wtht
ct
=

  1


1
+ 
+

1

+
1


1
sx
. (32)
14If we allow for a positive depreciation rate  of human capital, each of (23) and (29)
would feature , so that they cancel each other giving rise to the same condition as (30).
15It is useful to recall that at = vt=Nt.
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Combining equations (26), (31) and (32) solve the three endogenous variables
n, sr and sx. In the next section, we use these equilibrium conditions to
analyze the e¤ects of patent policy.
4 E¤ects of strengthening patent protection
Combining (26), (31) and (32) and then rearranging terms yield
2


1
n
+




1
n
 

1

+
1


(n) =



1

+
1


+



  1


, (33)
where (n) is a function of n given in (27). To ensure the existence of a unique
equilibrium n 2 (0; n), where n  (1 =), we impose the following upper
bound on the fertility-preference parameter .16
Condition E (equilibrium uniqueness):  <
(   )


1

+
1


.
The left-hand side (LHS) of (33) is initially decreasing in n while the right-
hand side (RHS) of (33) is independent of n. It is easy to see that limn!0 LHS >
RHS 2 (=; =+=). It can be shown that Condition E implies LHSjn=n <
RHS. Therefore, LHS crosses RHS exactly once giving rise to a unique
equilibrium n 2 (0; n).
As for the comparative statics of n with respect to the strength of patent
protection , we need to nd out whether an increase in  shifts RHS up or
down. If an increase in  shifts RHS down, then n would be increasing in
. See Figure 1 for an illustration. The rst term of RHS given by =() is
decreasing in , and this term captures the foregone-wage e¤ect of fertility. A
larger patent breadth weakens this foregone-wage e¤ect by decreasing wtht=ct
(i.e., the ratio of wage income to consumption) and leads to a higher rate
of fertility. The second term of RHS given by =() is also decreasing in
. This term captures the human-capital-diluting e¤ect of fertility, and a
larger patent breadth also weakens this e¤ect by decreasing wtht=ct. The
16When  is su¢ ciently large such that Condition E is violated, the model features
either no equilibrium or two equilibria, in which the additional equilibrium exhibits a high
population growth rate. In the numerical analysis, we show that Condition E is satised
under reasonably calibrated parameter values.
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third term of RHS given by (=)(   1)= is increasing in , and this
term captures the asset-diluting e¤ect of fertility. A larger patent breadth
strengthens this e¤ect by increasing prot income and at=ct (i.e., the ratio of
asset value to consumption) resulting in a lower rate of fertility. Although
there are two positive e¤ects versus one negative e¤ect, we nonetheless derive
an unambiguously positive e¤ect because the human-capital-diluting e¤ect
and the asset-diluting e¤ect of fertility cancel each other. To see this result,
RHS of (33) simplies to
RHS(
 
) =



1

+
1


+



  1


=


+


. (34)
Proposition 1 An increase in the strength of patent protection  increases
the equilibrium fertility rate n and decreases the long-run growth rates of
human capital, technology and consumption fgh; gz; gcg.
Proof. First, note that an increase in  shifts down RHS of (33). Then,
note (23), (24) and (25).
Furthermore, we nd that as households value fertility more (i.e., an in-
crease in ), they choose a higher rate of fertility n. As a result of higher
population growth, the economy exhibits a lower growth rate of human cap-
ital and slower technological progress in the long run. Therefore, a stronger
cultural preference on fertility reduces long-run growth. In the next section,
we also analyze the interactive e¤ect between fertility preference and patent
protection, and we nd that a stronger preference on fertility strengthens the
negative growth e¤ect of patent policy.
Proposition 2 An increase in the fertility-preference parameter  increases
the equilibrium fertility rate n and decreases the long-run growth rates of
human capital, technology and consumption fgh; gz; gcg.
Proof. First, note that an increase in  shifts up LHS of (33); see Figure
2. Then, note (23), (24) and (25).
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4.1 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to examine quantitatively the e¤ects
of patent breadth on R&D and economic growth. In the previous section, we
show that strengthening patent protection reduces long-run economic growth
through a higher population growth rate. Therefore, the semi-endogenous
growth model with exogenous population growth may not be an accurate
framework for analyzing the long-run growth e¤ects of patent policy. Here
we analyze this question quantitatively to see whether the e¤ects of patent
policy in a model with endogenous fertility are similar to that of a model
with exogenous fertility.
There are six structural parameters f; ; ; ; ; zg that are relevant for
this numerical exercise. First, we set the discount rate  to a standard
value of 0.04. Then, we consider a range of values for the fertility-preference
parameter  2 f0:5; 1; 2; 4g. Finally, we use the following four empirical
moments to pin down the values of the remaining four parameters. We
consider a long-run population growth rate of 1% for the US economy, and
the equilibrium condition for n is given by (33). We consider an innovation-
arrival rate of 0.2, which takes on an intermediate value within the range
considered by Acemoglu and Akcigit (2009). The equilibrium condition for
 is given by (27). We consider an R&D share of GDP of 0.025 for the US
economy, and this share is given by Sr  wLr=Y in the model.
Sr =

  1



+ 
. (35)
We consider a long-run growth rate of total factor productivity of 2%, and
the equilibrium condition is gz =  ln z. Given a chosen value for each of
 and , these four empirical moments determine the values of f; ; ; zg
respectively. The calibrated parameter values are reported in Table 1. It is
useful to note that Condition E (i.e., the parameter condition for equilibrium
uniqueness) is satised under these sets of parameter values.
Table 1: Calibration
    z
0:5 0:070 0:070 1:031 1:105
1:0 0:030 0:090 1:031 1:105
2:0 0:019 0:130 1:031 1:105
4:0 0:014 0:211 1:031 1:105
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Given these calibrated parameter values, we consider a counterfactual
policy experiment by increasing patent breadth such that  increases from
1.03 to 1.10 (i.e., patent breadth b = ln= ln z increases from about 0.3 to
1.0). The numerical results are reported in Table 2. We see that Sr (i.e., the
R&D share of GDP) roughly triples regardless of , and this e¤ect would
be similar to a semi-endogenous growth model with exogenous population
growth.17 However, the magnitude of the changes in fn; ; gzg is increasing
in , but these variables would be independent of patent breadth in a semi-
endogenous growth model with exogenous population growth. In the second
column of Table 2, we see that as  increases, strengthening patent protection
has a larger positive e¤ect on n, which in turn leads to a more dramatic
reduction in the steady-state values of  and gz.18 However, when  is
su¢ ciently small (e.g.,   1), the decreases in  and gz are negligible.
Table 2: Policy experiment ( = 1:10)
 n  Sr gz
0:5 1:005% 0:199 0:076 1:995%
1:0 1:008% 0:198 0:076 1:976%
2:0 1:010% 0:193 0:076 1:933%
4:0 1:011% 0:184 0:075 1:836%
 = 1:03 1:000% 0:200 0:025 2:000%
From this quantitative analysis, we conclude that whether analyzing the
e¤ects of patent policy in a model with exogenous fertility provides a good
approximation to a more realistic model with endogenous fertility largely
depends on the empirical value of the fertility-preference parameter . Here
we consider the calibrated values of n= (i.e., the fraction of time spent on
fertility) to narrow down the empirical range of . Using the calibrated values
of  in Table 1, one can show that  2 f0:5; 1; 2; 4g implies the following
calibrated values of n= 2 f0:14; 0:33; 0:54; 0:72g. According to the American
Time Use Survey from 2005 to 2009, an average person in households with
youngest child under 6 spends less than 3 hours per day for child caring as a
17To see this result, the steady-state value of  is independent of  in a semi-endogenous
growth model with exogenous population growth, so that the change in Sr is solely deter-
mined by the change in the markup ratio ( 1)=, which roughly triples when  increases
from 1.03 to 1.10.
18We will also consider an alternative numerical exercise, which is to increase  while
holding all the other parameters constant.
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primary activity.19 Assuming an average of 16 hours of non-sleeping time per
day, the fraction of time spent on child caring in the data is close to the lower
bound of the calibrated values of n= implying that the empirical value of 
should be reasonably small in the US. Therefore, a semi-endogenous growth
model with exogenous fertility should serve as a good approximation (for the
purpose of analyzing the long-run growth e¤ects of patent policy in the US)
to a semi-endogenous growth model with endogenous fertility.
Finally, we consider an alternative numerical exercise, which is to increase
 while holding all the other parameters constant. We use the set of para-
meter values that corresponds to  = 0:5 in Table 1 as our benchmark,20
and we vary  2 f0:2; 0:5; 0:8; 1:1; 1:4g.21 Table 3 shows the same result that
the magnitude of the negative growth e¤ect of patent policy is increasing in
. Therefore, for a culture that has a stronger preference on fertility, the
negative e¤ect of patent policy on long-run growth could be much larger.
Table 3: E¤ects of fertility preference
 n( = 1:03) n( = 1:10) gz( = 1:03) gz( = 1:10) gz
0:2 0:400% 0:401% 2:603% 2:602%  0:001%
0:5 1:000% 1:005% 2:000% 1:995%  0:005%
0:8 1:601% 1:613% 1:396% 1:384%  0:012%
1:1 2:206% 2:230% 0:788% 0:764%  0:024%
1:4 2:823% 2:902% 0:168% 0:088%  0:080%
5 Extension: Dilution with human capital
In this section, we consider an extension of our model by assuming that R&D
inputs are diluted by the scale of the economy following Laincz and Peretto
(2006). Under this specication, our model resembles a second-generation
R&D-based growth model, in which the long-run growth rate depends on
both the R&D share sr of factor inputs and the population growth rate n.
The key modication is to replace aggregate technology Zt in (16) by the
stock of human capital htNt (i.e., the scale of the economy) such that
t(j) = 'Lr;t(j)=(htNt). (36)
19Persons in households with older children spend even less time for child caring.
20Our result is robust to considering the other sets of parameter values.
21Under this set of parameter values, Condition E is violated at larger values of .
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Under this specication, the growth rate of technology becomes
gz;t = t ln z = (' ln z)sr;t, (37)
where sr;t = Lr;t=(htNt). The growth rate of (per capita) human capital
continues to be given by (23). Therefore, substituting (23) and (37) into
(22) yields the growth rate of (per capita) consumption given by
gc = gz + gh = (' ln z)sr   (1 + =)n+    . (38)
It is interesting to note that gc is now increasing in sr and continues to be
decreasing in n.
To solve the model, we use the R&D no-arbitrage condition (26) and
the resource constraint (31) as before. Combining these two conditions with
 = 'sr yields
sr =

  1




  
'
, (39)
sx =



1

+
1
'

. (40)
Equation (39) shows that R&D share sr is increasing in the strength of patent
protection . Substituting  = 'sr, (39) and (40) into the consumption-
fertility condition (32) yields
n = 

  1


1
+ 
+

1

+
1


1
sx
 1
, (41)
where 
  1


1
+ 
=
1


1
1 + '=

.
Therefore, although the equilibrium fertility rate n continues to be increas-
ing in the fertility-preference parameter , n is now independent of patent
strength . Because the equilibrium fertility rate is independent of patent
strength, the positive e¤ect of  on R&D share leads to a strictly positive
e¤ect on long-run growth. This rather di¤erent implication of patent pol-
icy may serve as an indirect test for the two alternative solutions to the
scale-e¤ect problem.
To understand why n is independent of  under this specication of the
model, recall that the consumption-fertility condition from (6) is

nt
=
at
ct
+
wtht
ct

1

+
1


.
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In this case, n is independent of  because at=ct and wtht=ct are independent
of . The ratio of asset value to consumption is given by
at
ct
=

  1


1
+ 
. (42)
Although the markup ratio (   1)= is increasing in , a larger  also
increases  in such a way that at=ct remains unchanged. Similarly, the ratio
of wage income to consumption is given by
wtht
ct
=
1
sx
, (43)
where an increase in  decreases sx in such a way that wtht=ct remains
unchanged. These two properties are driven by the constant returns to scale
of  = 'sr in sr.
Proposition 3 In the model with human-capital dilution, an increase in the
strength of patent protection  increases R&D share sr as well as the long-
run growth rates of technology and consumption fgz; gcg. An increase in
the fertility-preference parameter  increases the equilibrium fertility rate n
and decreases the long-run growth rates of human capital and consumption
fgh; gcg.
Proof. First, note that an increase in  raises sr in (39), which in turn
increases gz in (37) and gc in (38). Then, note that an increase in  raises
n in (41), which in turn decreases gh in (23) and gc in (38).
6 Conclusion
In this study, we have considered two versions of the scale-invariant quality-
ladder model with endogenous fertility to analyze the e¤ects of patent policy
on long-run economic growth. Under the semi-endogenous-growth specica-
tion, we nd that although strengthening patent protection has a positive
e¤ect on R&D, it has a negative e¤ect on technological progress in the long
run through endogenous fertility. In the quantitative analysis, we nd that
the magnitude of this channel depends on the empirical value of a preference
20
parameter on fertility. Calibrating this parameter to a reasonable value for
the US economy, we nd that the long-run growth e¤ects of patent policy
through endogenous fertility are negligible. In this case, our model with
endogenous fertility resembles the semi-endogenous growth model with ex-
ogenous fertility. However, for a culture that has a stronger preference on
fertility, the negative growth e¤ect of patent policy through endogenous fer-
tility could be quantitatively signicant. Therefore, an interesting direction
for future research would be to empirically examine these e¤ects across coun-
tries. Under the fully endogenous-growth specication, strengthening patent
protection has a positive e¤ect on R&D and no e¤ect on fertility. Therefore,
the di¤erent equilibrium e¤ects of patent policy on long-run growth under
the two specications may serve as an indirect test for the two alternative
solutions to the scale-e¤ect problem.
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